Arbeitspapier

Immunity

Legal provisions that protect politicians from arrest and prosecution exist throughout much of the modern democratic world. Why, and with what effects, do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution of immunity both theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical model demonstrates that immunity is a double-edged sword; while statutory immunity provisions protect honest politicians from politically-motivated charges, they may also incentivize corrupt behavior. Which effect dominates depends on the quality of the judicial system. In order to empirically analyze the effects of immunity provisions, we quantify the strength of immunity protection enjoyed by heads of government, ministers, and legislators in 73 democracies. We find empirical evidence that though stronger immunity protection is associated with greater corruption where the judicial system is independent, this relationship has more ambiguous effects where the legal system is weak and susceptible to politicization. These effects remain after controlling for standard determinants of corruption.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4445

Classification
Wirtschaft
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Subject
accountability
corruption
immunity
interest groups

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Reddy, Karthik
Schularick, Moritz
Skreta, Vasiliki
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Reddy, Karthik
  • Schularick, Moritz
  • Skreta, Vasiliki
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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