Airline alliances, antitrust immunity and market foreclosure

Arbeitspapier

We examine the issue of market foreclosure by airline partnerships with antitrust immunity. Overlapping data on frequency of service and passenger volumes on non-stop transatlantic routes with information on the dynamics of airline partnerships, we find evidence consistent with the airlines operating under antitrust immunity refusing to accept connecting passengers from the outside carriers at respective hub airports. Following the antitrust immunity, airlines outside the partnership reduce their traffic to the partner airlines' hub airports by 4.1-11.5 percent. We suggest regulators should take possible market foreclosure effects into account when assessing the competitive effects of antitrust immunity for airline alliances.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 10-083 [rev.]

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Air Transportation ; Antitrust Law
• Subject: air transportation ; alliances ; antitrust immunity ; foreclosure

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bilotkach, Volodymyr ; Hüschelrath, Kai
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66121
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET