Arbeitspapier
Transparency and policy competition: Experimental evidence from German citizens and politicians
A lack of transparency about policy performance can pose a major obstacle to welfareenhancing policy competition across jurisdictions. In parallel surveys with German citizens and state parliamentarians, we document that both groups misperceive the performance of their state's education system. Experimentally providing performance information polarizes citizens' political satisfaction between high- and low-performing states and increases their demand for greater transparency of states' educational performance. Parliamentarians' support for the transparency policy is opportunistic: Performance information increases (decreases) policy support in high-performing (low-performing) states. We conclude that increasing the public salience of educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfareenhancing reforms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 390
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Education: Government Policy
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Yardstick competition
beliefs
information
citizens
politicians
survey experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Blesse, Sebastian
Lergetporer, Philipp
Nover, Justus
Werner, Katharina
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Blesse, Sebastian
- Lergetporer, Philipp
- Nover, Justus
- Werner, Katharina
- ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
Entstanden
- 2023