Arbeitspapier

Monopoly quality degradation in cable television

Using an empirical framework derived from models of nonlinear pricing, we estimate the degree of quality degradation in cable television markets. We find lower bounds on quality degradation ranging from 11% to 45% of observed service qualities. Furthermore, cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight tend to offer significantly higher quality products, and engage in less quality degradation. While prices are also higher in markets with local regulatory oversight, we find that consumers experienced greater quality per dollar in these markets compared to consumers in markets without regulatory oversight.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 502

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Thema
Kabelfernsehen
Dienstleistungsqualität
Monopol
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Crawford, Gregory S.
Shum, Matthew
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Baltimore, MD
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Crawford, Gregory S.
  • Shum, Matthew
  • The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2003

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