Arbeitspapier
Pension benefit insurance and pension plan portfolio choice
Pension benefit guarantee policies have been introduced in several countries to protect private pension plan members from the loss of income that would occur if a plan was underfunded when the sponsoring firm terminates a plan. Most of these public insurance schemes face financial difficulty and consequently policy reforms are being discussed or implemented. Economic theory suggests that such schemes will face moral hazard and adverse selection problems. In this note we test a specific theoretical prediction: insured plans will invest more heavily in risky assets. Our test exploits differences in insurance arrangements across Canadian jurisdictions. We find that insured plans invest about 5 percent more in equities than do similar plans without benefit guarantees.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2498
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions
- Thema
-
Pensions
benefit guarantee
moral hazard
Pensionsfonds
Private Rentenversicherung
Garantie
Portfolio-Management
Moral Hazard
Kanada
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Crossley, Thomas F.
Jametti, Mario
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Crossley, Thomas F.
- Jametti, Mario
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2008