Ambiguity and Social Interaction

Arbeitspapier

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 59

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Externalities ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
• Thema: Ambiguity ; Optimism ; Pessimism ; Strategic Games ; Oligopoly ; Strategic Delegation ; Peace-making ; Strategic Complements ; Choquet Expected Utility

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Eichberger, Jürgen ; Kelsey, David ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13491
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94022
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13491-0
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ