Arbeitspapier
The existence of the Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence equilibrium with continuous type distributions
We prove the existence of an equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection in the sense of Miyazaki (1977), Wilson (1977), and Spence (1978) when the distribution of unobservable risk types is continuous. Our proof leverages the finite-type proof in Spence (1978) and a limiting argument akin to Hellwig (2007)'s study of optimal taxation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ICIR Working Paper Series ; No. 32/18
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Perfect Competition
- Thema
-
asymmetric and private information
insurance market
adverse selection
equilibrium
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gemmo, Irina
Kubitza, Christian
Rothschild, Casey G.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gemmo, Irina
- Kubitza, Christian
- Rothschild, Casey G.
- Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR)
Entstanden
- 2018