Arbeitspapier

Privatization and liberalization in vertically linked markets

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often vertically integrated firms which operate in key industries like transport, telecommunication and power generation. They provide an infrastructure and invest in its quality. We discuss the effects of liberalization and their privatization which can be complete or partial such that upstream production is still run by an SOE. We show that granting a downstream rival access to the infrastructure of a vertically integrated private firm is welfare improving in most cases even if a holdup problem exists. For any vertically separated structure we find that privatization through multi-product firms welfare dominates privatization through single-product firms.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: TranState Working Papers ; No. 95

Classification
Wirtschaft
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Organization of Production
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
Subject
Privatization
vertical integration
state-owned enterprises
Öffentliches Unternehmen
Vertikale Konzentration
Netzzugang
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Privatisierung
Deregulierung
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Stähler, Frank
Traub, Stefan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597 - Transformations of the State
(where)
Bremen
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Stähler, Frank
  • Traub, Stefan
  • Universität Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597 - Transformations of the State

Time of origin

  • 2009

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