Arbeitspapier
VAT Compliance, Trade, and Institutions
We develop a simple structural model of value added tax (VAT) compliance, and estimate it using widely available national accounts data to learn about compliance in countries where little is currently known. International border controls improve VAT compliance, generating a correlation between imports and aggregate VAT revenues that is informative about domestic non-compliance. Estimates suggest that revenue lost due to domestic non-compliance is large, particularly in countries with low perceived institutional quality. Border controls keep overall VAT revenues high especially in countries open to international trade.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7780
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Morrow, Peter
Smart, Michael
Swistak, Artur
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2019
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Morrow, Peter
- Smart, Michael
- Swistak, Artur
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2019