Arbeitspapier

VAT Compliance, Trade, and Institutions

We develop a simple structural model of value added tax (VAT) compliance, and estimate it using widely available national accounts data to learn about compliance in countries where little is currently known. International border controls improve VAT compliance, generating a correlation between imports and aggregate VAT revenues that is informative about domestic non-compliance. Estimates suggest that revenue lost due to domestic non-compliance is large, particularly in countries with low perceived institutional quality. Border controls keep overall VAT revenues high especially in countries open to international trade.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7780

Classification
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Tax Evasion and Avoidance

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Morrow, Peter
Smart, Michael
Swistak, Artur
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Morrow, Peter
  • Smart, Michael
  • Swistak, Artur
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2019

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