Contests with incumbency advantages: An experiment investigation of the effect of limits on spending behavior and outcome

Arbeitspapier

This paper experimentally investigates the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome in an electoral contest where two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, compete for office in terms of the amount of campaign expenditure. The candidates are asymmetric only in that the incumbent wins the contest in case of a tie. Theory predicts that in the presence of such asymmetry spending limits put the challenger at a disadvantage and tightening the limits leads to further entrenchment of the incumbent. The experimental results confirmed the theoretical predictions regarding the effect of limits on campaign spending and outcome but yielded partial support to other predictions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,020

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Contest ; All-pay auction ; Spending limit ; Incumbency advantage ; Experiment ; Wahlkampf ; Wahlkampffinanzierung ; Wettbewerb ; Auktionstheorie ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Otsubo, Hironori
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70161
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET