Arbeitspapier

Comment on: Electoral contests, incumbency advantages, and campaign finance

This paper completes Meirowitz (2008) by analyzing the effect of a cap on political campaign spending in an environment where voters have initial preferences over political candidates. The policy implications are starkly different from the previously analyzed case where voters are indifferent between candidates in the absence of campaign spending. We find that a spending cap always favors the a priori popular candidate. This result holds irrespective of whether it is the incumbent or the challenger who is able to more effectively generate and spend contributions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP09/13

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Campaign finance reform
Spending limit
Expenditure limit
Incumbency advantage
Clean elections

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Pastine, Ivan
Pastine, Tuvana
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
(where)
Dublin
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Pastine, Ivan
  • Pastine, Tuvana
  • University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2009

Other Objects (12)