Arbeitspapier
Comment on: Electoral contests, incumbency advantages, and campaign finance
This paper completes Meirowitz (2008) by analyzing the effect of a cap on political campaign spending in an environment where voters have initial preferences over political candidates. The policy implications are starkly different from the previously analyzed case where voters are indifferent between candidates in the absence of campaign spending. We find that a spending cap always favors the a priori popular candidate. This result holds irrespective of whether it is the incumbent or the challenger who is able to more effectively generate and spend contributions.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP09/13
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Campaign finance reform
Spending limit
Expenditure limit
Incumbency advantage
Clean elections
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Pastine, Ivan
Pastine, Tuvana
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
- (where)
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Dublin
- (when)
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2009
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Pastine, Ivan
- Pastine, Tuvana
- University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
Time of origin
- 2009