Arbeitspapier
Using Political Financing Reforms to Measure Campaign Spending Effects on Electoral Outcomes
This paper studies the impact of campaign spending on votes in French legislative elections. We exploit the political financing reforms which were adopted in France in the mid-1990s. Under the new laws, spending limits were reduced, legal persons were no longer allowed to finance candidates, and the maximal amount of personal expenditures reimbursed by the State was augmented. We have data on two consecutive elections (one before and one after the reforms) and focus on candidates who competed in both of them. We find that the difference in candidates’ campaign expenses across elections is strongly affected by the reforms. We then estimate a structural vote equation using panel data to control for unobserved characteristics of candidates. Spending has a statistically significant effect, but only for challengers. We cannot reject the hypothesis that challenger spending has the same impact across the various political parties in France.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6232
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
campaign spending
elections
political financing reforms
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
François, Abel
Visser, Michael
Wilner, Lionel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- François, Abel
- Visser, Michael
- Wilner, Lionel
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2016
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Political campaign spending limits
Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters
Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign
Direct Democracy and Indirect Electoral Campaign
Structural tax reforms and public spending efficiency
Proportional influence? Electoral rules and special interest spending
The long and short of financing government spending
Early years spending update: Budget reforms and beyond
The State of Electoral Reforms in Ghana
The State of Electoral Reforms in Ghana
Electoral system change and spending: Four quantitative case studies
Electoral competition and social spending in the Argentine provinces
Political campaign spending limits
Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters
Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign
Direct Democracy and Indirect Electoral Campaign
Structural tax reforms and public spending efficiency
Proportional influence? Electoral rules and special interest spending
The long and short of financing government spending
Early years spending update: Budget reforms and beyond
The State of Electoral Reforms in Ghana
The State of Electoral Reforms in Ghana
Electoral system change and spending: Four quantitative case studies
Electoral competition and social spending in the Argentine provinces
Political campaign spending limits
Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters
Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign
Direct Democracy and Indirect Electoral Campaign
Structural tax reforms and public spending efficiency
Proportional influence? Electoral rules and special interest spending
The long and short of financing government spending
Early years spending update: Budget reforms and beyond
The State of Electoral Reforms in Ghana
The State of Electoral Reforms in Ghana
Electoral system change and spending: Four quantitative case studies