Arbeitspapier

Corporate governance of financial institutions

We identify the tension created by the dual demands of financial institutions to be value-maximizing entities that also serve the public interest. We highlight the importance of information in addressing the public's desire for banks to be safe yet innovative. Regulators can choose several approaches to increase market discipline and information production. First, they can mandate information production outside of markets through increased regulatory disclosure. Second, they can directly motivate potential producers of information by changing their incentives. Traditional approaches to bank governance may interfere with the information content of prices. Thus, the lack of transparency in the banking industry may be a symptom rather than the primary cause of bad governance. We provide the examples of compensation and resolution. Reforms that promote the quality of security prices through information production can improve the governance of financial institutions. Future research is needed to examine the interactions between disclosure, information, and governance.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Staff Report ; No. 539

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Corporate Finance and Governance: Other
Thema
financial institutions, governance, disclosure, information, market discipline, financial crisis

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mehran, Hamid
Mollineaux, Lindsay
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mehran, Hamid
  • Mollineaux, Lindsay
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Entstanden

  • 2012

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