The Effect of Franchise No-Poaching Restrictions on Worker Earnings

Arbeitspapier

We evaluate the impact of the Washington State Attorney General's enforcement campaign against employee no-poaching clauses in franchising contracts, which unfolded from 2018 through early 2020. Implementing a staggered difference-in-differences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports, we document the nationwide effect of the enforcement campaign on pay at franchising chains across numerous industries. Our preferred specification estimates a 6.6% increase in posted annual earnings from the job vacancy data and an approximate 4% increase in worker-reported earnings.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16330

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets ; Antitrust Law ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
• Thema: employer market power ; franchising ; antitrust ; oligopsony

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Callaci, Brian ; Gibson, Matthew ; Pinto, Sergio ; Steinbaum, Marshall ; Walsh, Matt
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/279028
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ