The Effect of Franchise No-Poaching Restrictions on Worker Earnings

Arbeitspapier

We evaluate the impact of the Washington State Attorney General's enforcement campaign against employee no-poaching clauses in franchising contracts, which unfolded from 2018 through early 2020. Implementing a staggered difference-in-differences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports, we document the nationwide effect of the enforcement campaign on pay at franchising chains across numerous industries. Our preferred specification estimates a 6.6% increase in posted annual earnings from the job vacancy data and an approximate 4% increase in worker-reported earnings.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16330

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets ; Antitrust Law ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
• Subject: employer market power ; franchising ; antitrust ; oligopsony

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Callaci, Brian ; Gibson, Matthew ; Pinto, Sergio ; Steinbaum, Marshall ; Walsh, Matt
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2023

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/279028
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET