Tipping the scales: Conciliation, appeal and the relevance of judicial ambition

Arbeitspapier

Judges become ambitious decision makers when they face appellate review. This paper applies a contract theoretic perspective to the behavior of self-interested trial judges in a twolevel court system and analyzes the consequences for contracting in 'the shadow of' the court. Confronted with the factual ambiguity of an assigned case, rational judges pursue an (privately) optimal strategy to conclude the dispute and tip the scales of the trial outcome. We show that even if judges generally dislike errors and have no personal preference for a specific party, these effects of judicial agency manipulate the implemented court accuracy and degrade the contract outcome. Our implications put into perspective the traditional function of appellate courts to foster the accuracy of enforcement and identify the need for a complex measurement of judicial performance. The model also reveals that a judicial tendency to conclude lawsuits in the conciliatory hearing may overly strain contract output.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Diskussionspapier ; No. 137

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Contract Law ; Litigation Process
• Subject: Court error ; judicial behavior ; reputation ; contract theory

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Christmann, Robin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Helmut-Schmidt-Universität - Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre
• (where): Hamburg
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98416
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET