The golden hello and political transitions

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from in-ternational financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3957

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; International Relations and International Political Economy: Other ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
• Subject: political transitions ; democracy ; autocracy ; IMF ; World Bank ; Anpassungsprogramm des IWF ; Entwicklungsfinanzierung ; Wirkungsanalyse ; Autoritäres System ; Demokratisierung ; Politische Reform ; Politische Stabilität ; Theorie ; Schätzung ; Welt

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Aidt, Toke S. ; Albornoz, Facundo ; Gassebner, Martin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65390
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET