New Networks, Competition and Regulation

Arbeitspapier

We consider a model with two firms operating their individual networks. Each firm can choose its price as well as its investment to build up its network. Assuming a skewed distribution of consumers, our model leads to an asymmetric market structure with one firm choosing higher investments. While access regulation imposed on the dominant firm leads to lower prices, positive welfare effects are diminished by strategic investment decisions of the firms. Within a dynamic game with indirect network effects leading to potentially increased demand, regulation can substantially lower aggregate social welfare. Conditional access holidays can alleviate regulatory failure.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 568

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economics of Regulation ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: Regulation ; network effects ; natural monopoly ; Stromnetz ; Netzzugang ; Elektrizitätswirtschaft ; Regulierung ; Niederlande ; EU-Staaten ; Großbritannien ; Neuseeland

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Baake, Pio ; Kameckey, Ulrich
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18461
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ