Arbeitspapier
Optimal Redistributive Pensions and the Cost of Self-Control
We examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influences the trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals' welfare by altering how yielding to temptation (i.e. not saving, or saving less) is attractive. We show that proportional taxation increases the cost of self-control, and that this adverse effect is more acute when public pensions become more redistributive.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4937
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Subject
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taxation
redistribution
pensions
self-control
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
Garon, Jean-Denis
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
- Garon, Jean-Denis
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2014