Arbeitspapier

Optimal Redistributive Pensions and the Cost of Self-Control

We examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influences the trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals' welfare by altering how yielding to temptation (i.e. not saving, or saving less) is attractive. We show that proportional taxation increases the cost of self-control, and that this adverse effect is more acute when public pensions become more redistributive.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4937

Classification
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Subject
taxation
redistribution
pensions
self-control

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
Garon, Jean-Denis
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
  • Garon, Jean-Denis
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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