Arbeitspapier

Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model

This paper characterizes optimal non-linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the labor markets. Redistributive taxation distorts labor demand and wages. Compared to their efficient values, gross wages, unemployment and participation are lower. Average tax rates are increasing. Marginal tax rates are positive, even at the top. Finally, numerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than in a comparable Mirrlees (1971) setting.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1460

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
Thema
optimal income taxation
unemployment
wage bargaining
matching
Einkommensteuer
Einkommensumverteilung
Optimale Besteuerung
Arbeitslosigkeit
Lohnverhandlungen
Matching
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hungerbühler, Mathias
Lehmann, Etienne
Parmentier, Alexis
van der Linden, Bruno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hungerbühler, Mathias
  • Lehmann, Etienne
  • Parmentier, Alexis
  • van der Linden, Bruno
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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