Arbeitspapier

Cooperative Models in Action : Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation

Several theoretical contributions, starting with McElroy and Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980), have suggested to model household behavior as a Nash-bargaining game. Since then, very few attempts have been made to operationalize cooperative models of household labor supply for policy analysis. In this paper, we implement a Nash-bargaining model with external threat points (divorce) into the microsimulation of tax policy reforms in France. Following the suggestion of McElroy (1990) to achieve identification, we assume that the observation of single individuals can be used to predict outside options. Individual preferences in couples are allowed to display caring between spouses and are simulated in a way which guarantee consistency with the Nash bargaining setting, regularity conditions and observed behaviors. An extensive sensitivity analysis is provided in order to examine the various implications from using the cooperative model for tax policy analysis and the likely role of taxation on intra-household negotiation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1480

Classification
Wirtschaft
Consumer Economics: Theory
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
Cooperative Games
Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
Subject
collective model
Nash-bargaining model
intrahousehold allocation
household labor supply
tax reform
microsimulation
Haushaltsökonomik
Familienökonomik
Arbeitsangebot
Verhandlungstheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Familienbesteuerung
Steuerreform
Alleinerziehende
Steuerwirkung
Theorie
Simulation
Frankreich

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bargain, Olivier
Moreau, Nicolas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bargain, Olivier
  • Moreau, Nicolas
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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