Arbeitspapier

Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good

For several years, an increasing number of firms are investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non- excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in OSS. In particular we ask how (1) market entry and (2) public investments in the public good affects the firms' production and profits. Surprisingly, we find that there exist cases where incumbents benefit from market entry. Moreover, we show the counter-intuitive result that public spending does not necessarily lead to a decreasing voluntary private contribution.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: BGPE Discussion Paper ; No. 4

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Thema
Open Source Software
Private Provision of Public Goods
Cournot- Nash Equilibrium
Complements
Market Entry

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schmidtke, Richard
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)
(wo)
Nürnberg
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schmidtke, Richard
  • Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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