Arbeitspapier
Reputation or Reciprocity? An Experimental Investigation
Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that in the repeated game some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that a long-term interaction is a reciprocity-compatible contract enforcement device.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 496
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Reciprocity
reputation
repeated games
incomplete contracts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gaechter, Simon
Falk, Armin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gaechter, Simon
- Falk, Armin
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2001
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