Arbeitspapier

Special interest groups versus voters and the political economics of attention

We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to politics. Based on 425 roll calls between 2005 and 2014 in the US House of Representatives, we show that representatives are more likely to vote with special interests and against constituency interests when the two are in conflict. Importantly, the latter effect is significantly larger when there is less attention on politics due to exogenous newsworthy events. The opportunistic behavior seems not to be mediated by short-term scheduling of sensitive votes right after distracting events.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WWZ Working Paper ; No. 2020/06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Entertainment; Media
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Thema
Attention
campaign finance
interest groups
legislative voting
mass media
roll call voting
US House of Representatives

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Balles, Patrick
Matter, Ulrich
Stutzer, Alois
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.5451/unibas-ep76482
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Balles, Patrick
  • Matter, Ulrich
  • Stutzer, Alois
  • University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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