Arbeitspapier
Charity as a signal of trustworthhiness
Being perceived as trustworthy comes with substantial economic benefits in many situations. Making other people think you are a trustworthy person may, therefore, be an important motive for charity and other forms of prosocial behavior, provided these activities work as signals of trustworthiness. This paper shows that donating money to an NGO substantially raises the other players' beliefs about the donors' trustworthiness in a simple trust game. Consequently, donors receive higher transfers. The magnitude of these benefits is substantial.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5299
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
- Thema
-
charity
signaling
trust
trustworthiness
Wohltätigkeit
Signalling
Vertrauen
Soziale Beziehungen
Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fehrler, Sebastian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fehrler, Sebastian
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2010
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