Hochschulschrift
Supply chain coordination with contracts in case of asymmetric information : assessing the theoretical and experimental effectiveness of implement just-in-time strategies with screening contracts
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Dimensions
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31 cm
- Extent
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XVIII, 216 S.
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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graph. Darst.
Magdeburg, Univ., Diss., 2010
- Creator
- Table of contents
- Rights
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Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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11.06.2025, 1:46 PM CEST
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Hochschulschrift
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