Hochschulschrift
Supply chain coordination with contracts in case of asymmetric information : assessing the theoretical and experimental effectiveness of implement just-in-time strategies with screening contracts
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Maße
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31 cm
- Umfang
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XVIII, 216 S.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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graph. Darst.
Magdeburg, Univ., Diss., 2010
- Urheber
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
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Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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11.06.2025, 13:46 MESZ
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Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
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