Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

O intuicionismo e o problema com as provas não construtivas

This article aims to evaluate the intuitionist problem with non-constructive mathematicals proofs. For this constructivist position the principle of the excluded middle, of classical logic, shouldn't operate on mathematical demonsrations. Non-constructive proofs aren't accepted, and the constructive proofs are the only with positive character. After a brief introduction about intuitionism and its creator, the article will address the relationship between the principle of the excluded middle and the mathematicals demonstrations, so to talk about the problem of non-constructive proofs and the consequences for not to accepting them. Taking the mathematics only as a mental construction project, the intuitionism break with the dominant platonic realism and establishing a fruitful debate on the foundations of mathematics.

O intuicionismo e o problema com as provas não construtivas

Urheber*in: Melo, Diego Henrique Figueira de

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Weitere Titel
The intuitionism and the problem with non-constructive proofs
ISSN
2178-1036
Umfang
Seite(n): 100-110
Sprache
Portugiesisch
Anmerkungen
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

Erschienen in
Griot: Revista de Filosofia, 15(1)

Thema
Philosophie
Philosophie, Theologie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Melo, Diego Henrique Figueira de
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wo)
Brasilien
(wann)
2017

DOI
Rechteinformation
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
Letzte Aktualisierung
21.06.2024, 16:26 MESZ

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Objekttyp

  • Zeitschriftenartikel

Beteiligte

  • Melo, Diego Henrique Figueira de

Entstanden

  • 2017

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