Non-horizontal mergers with investments into compatibility

Arbeitspapier

We set up a model to analyze the effects of mergers between sellers of complementary components where firms invest in compatibility and can engage in bundling. We consider the impact of merger on prices, investment and consumer surplus. We also analyse when the merged firm may have an incentive and ability to foreclose rivals.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7617

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Subject: mergers ; complementary goods ; welfare effects ; foreclosure ; compatibility

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Langus, Gregor ; Lipatov, Vilen ; Padilla, Jorge
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/198977
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET