Konferenzbeitrag
Environmental Pollution & the Political Economy of Public Debt
This paper analyzes the political economy of government debt when elected politicians decide about the distribution of public funds between a clean and a polluting public good. When provision of the polluting good creates a stock of climate externalities, strategic incentives for the incumbent government arise from both a budget and emission interaction. In this framework, reelection uncertainty leads to inefficiently low public savings (or even debt) which are attenuated by the emission interaction, while first period pollution decreases regardless of the future government's identity. If the incumbent government competes for office against an environmentalists' party, the total welfare loss from emissions also decreases as a direct result of reelection uncertainty.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Public Goods
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Thema
-
emission externality
public debt
political economy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Kellner, Maximilian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (wo)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
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2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Kellner, Maximilian
- ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Entstanden
- 2020