Arbeitspapier
Low quality as a signal of high quality
If a product has two dimensions of quality, one observable and one not, a firm can use observable quality as a signal of unobservable quality. The correlation between consumers' valuation of high quality in each dimension is a key determinant of the feasibility of such signaling. A firm may use price alone as a signal, or price and quality together. Both signals tend to be used when the market is very uninformed, whereas price signaling alone tends to be used when the market is moderately informed. If high observable quality is inexpensive to provide, then it cannot signal high unobservable quality, and low observable quality is always an indication that unobservable quality is high.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2010-20
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Thema
-
Signaling
quality
Produktqualität
Signalling
Betriebliche Preispolitik
Konsumentenverhalten
Informationsverhalten
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Clements, Matthew T.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Clements, Matthew T.
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2010
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