- Sprache
-
Spanisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Serie Documentos de Trabajo ; No. 674
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
perfect Bayesian equilibrium
refinement
signals
credible deviations
self-selection condition
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Streb, Jorge M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
- (wo)
-
Buenos Aires
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Streb, Jorge M.
- Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
Entstanden
- 2018
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play
How to compute perfect foresight equilibria
On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
Uniformly perfect equilibria in a Neo-Keynesian model
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play
How to compute perfect foresight equilibria
On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
Uniformly perfect equilibria in a Neo-Keynesian model
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play
How to compute perfect foresight equilibria
On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
Uniformly perfect equilibria in a Neo-Keynesian model
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games