Arbeitspapier

How global rules are established and stabilized

This paper analyzes how international rules are established and stabilized, i.e. how an international institutional order develops. Rules emerge mainly through learning from negative experience and serve to reduce transaction costs. The paper looks at mechanisms that stabilize rule systems, at bargaining procedures for cooperation gains, dispute settlement, sanctions, side payments, self-enforcing contracts, waivers and regional integrations within a multilateral order. In addition it analyzes the prevention of negative spillovers, international courts and global public goods.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1388

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Economic Order and Integration
Economic Systems: General
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
Economic Integration
Law and Economics: General
Economic History: General
Subject
Transaction costs
Institutional competition
Gains from cooperation
Bargaining for cooperation gains
Positive mechanisms
International rules
Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht
Internationale Handelspolitik
Transaktionskosten
Institutioneller Wettbewerb
Internationale Zusammenarbeit
Verhandlungen
Internalisierung externer Effekte
Theorie
Welt

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Siebert, Horst
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Siebert, Horst
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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