Arbeitspapier
The Consequences of a Piece Rate on Quantity and Quality: Evidence from a Field Experiment
This field experiment examines output quantity and quality for workers in a data input business. We observe two sets of workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. Committed workers also produce higher quantity and quality, showing the role of worker selection - which appears especially strong under time rates. Our results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to deliver its chosen quality-quantity combination.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7660
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
piece rate
monitoring
shirking
quantity and quality trade off
field experiment
worker committment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Heywood, John S.
Siebert, W. Stanley
Wei, Xiangdong
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Heywood, John S.
- Siebert, W. Stanley
- Wei, Xiangdong
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013
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