The Consequences of a Piece Rate on Quantity and Quality: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Arbeitspapier

This field experiment examines output quantity and quality for workers in a data input business. We observe two sets of workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. Committed workers also produce higher quantity and quality, showing the role of worker selection - which appears especially strong under time rates. Our results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to deliver its chosen quality-quantity combination.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7660

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: piece rate ; monitoring ; shirking ; quantity and quality trade off ; field experiment ; worker committment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Heywood, John S. ; Siebert, W. Stanley ; Wei, Xiangdong
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89992
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET