Arbeitspapier

Long-Run Consequences of Health Insurance Promotion: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ghana

We study the long-run impacts of health insurance promotion in Northern Ghana. We randomly provide three overlapping interventions to promote enrollment: subsidy, information campaign, and convenient sign-up option, with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. Our interventions, especially the subsidy, promote enrollment and healthcare service utilization in the short and long runs. We also find short-run health status improvements, which disappear in the long run. We find suggestive evidence on decreased investment in disease prevention and selection that may help explain this pattern of health status changes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11117

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Thema
health insurance
sustainability
moral hazard
selection
screening effect
randomized experiments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Asuming, Patrick Opoku
Kim, Hyuncheol Bryant
Sim, Armand
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Asuming, Patrick Opoku
  • Kim, Hyuncheol Bryant
  • Sim, Armand
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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