Artikel
Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences
We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally, anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of voters. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms, in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-proofness leads to an impossibility.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 485-496 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
strategy-proof voting
continuum of voters
multidimensional policy space
elliptic preferences
Abstimmungsregel
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Peters, Hans
Roy, Souvik
Storcken, Ton
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Springer
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2011
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0048-5
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Peters, Hans
- Roy, Souvik
- Storcken, Ton
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2011
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