Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences

Artikel

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally, anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of voters. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms, in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-proofness leads to an impossibility.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2011 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 485-496 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: strategy-proof voting ; continuum of voters ; multidimensional policy space ; elliptic preferences ; Abstimmungsregel ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Peters, Hans ; Roy, Souvik ; Storcken, Ton
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Springer
• (where): Heidelberg
• (when): 2011

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0048-5
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77770
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET