- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences ; 2018,21
- Klassifikation
-
Politik
- Schlagwort
-
Steuervermeidung
Steuermoral
Durchsetzung
Rechtsnorm
Soziale Probleme
Prestige
Steuerschuld ; Verhalten
Slowenien
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Hohenheim
- (wer)
-
Kommunikations-, Informations- und Medienzentrum der Universität Hohenheim
- (wann)
-
2018
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-15260
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 15.08.2025, 07:31 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Dwenger, Najda
- Treber, Lukas
- Kommunikations-, Informations- und Medienzentrum der Universität Hohenheim
Entstanden
- 2018
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