Arbeitspapier

Subsidizing firm entry in open economies

Entrepreneurs who decide to enter an industry are faced with different levels of effective entry costs in different countries. These costs are heavily influenced by economic policy. What is not well understood is how international trade affects the government incentive to impact on entry costs, and how entry subsidies can be used strategically in open economies. We present a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with two (potentially) asymmetric countries and heterogeneous firms where government subsidizes entry of domestic entrepreneurs. Under autarky the entry subsidy indirectly corrects for the monopoly pricing distortion. In the autarky equilibrium these subsidies trigger entry, but they eventually do not lead to more but to better firms in the market. In the open economy there is another, strategic motive for entry subsidies as the tightening of domestic market selection also affects exporting decisions for domestic and foreign firms. Our analysis shows that entry subsidies in the Nash-equilibrium are first increasing, then decreasing in the level of trade openness. This implies a U-shaped relationship between openness and effective entry costs. Merging cross-country data on entry costs with international trade openness indices we empirically confirm this theoretical prediction.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4384

Classification
Wirtschaft
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Subject
Firm entry
subsidies
heterogeneous firms
international trade
monopolistic competition
entry regulation
strategic trade policy
Markteintritt
Unternehmer
Subvention
Monopolistischer Wettbewerb
Außenwirtschaft
Offene Volkswirtschaft
Strategische Handelspolitik
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Pflüger, Michael
Südekum, Jens
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2009

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-200910086460
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Pflüger, Michael
  • Südekum, Jens
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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