Arbeitspapier

Do Employees Benefit from Worker Representation on Corporate Boards?

Do employees benefit from worker representation on corporate boards? Economists and policymakers are keenly interested in this question – especially lately, as worker representation is widely promoted as an important way to ensure the interests and views of the workers. To investigate this question, we apply a variety of research designs to administrative data from Norway. We find that a worker is paid more and faces less earnings risk if she gets a job in a firm with worker representation on the corporate board. However, these gains in wages and declines in earnings risk are not caused by worker representation per se. Instead, the wage premium and reduced earnings risk reflect that firms with worker representation are likely to be larger and unionized, and that larger and unionized firms tend to both pay a premium and provide better insurance to workers against fluctuations in firm performance. Conditional on the firm’s size and unionization rate, worker representation has little if any effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that while workers may indeed benefit from being employed in firms with worker representation, they would not benefit from legislation mandating worker representation on corporate boards.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8794

Classification
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms; Employee Ownership
Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: Public Policy
Subject
worker compensation
worker representation
corporate governance
unions

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Blandhol, Christine
Mogstad, Magne
Nilsson, Peter
Vestad, Ola Lotherington
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2020

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Blandhol, Christine
  • Mogstad, Magne
  • Nilsson, Peter
  • Vestad, Ola Lotherington
  • Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2020

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