Arbeitspapier

Bargaining for fiscal control: Tax federalism in Brazil and Mexico, 1870-1940

This paper studies the historical origins of the federalist institutions in Mexico and Brazil. Using a bargaining game model, I argue that the type of commodities each country produced by the end of the nineteenth Century determined the negotiation power of local governments. This led to the buildup of opposite federalist institutions in both countries, which have persisted until nowadays. The model shows that countries with regions with more autonomy to produce and trade their commodities increase the local power to collect more taxes. While in Brazil coffee was the most important commodity, Mexico relied on mining products. Coffee was produced by local landowners who became economically powerful and they were able that export taxes were collected locally with the proclamation of the 1891 Constitution. Empirical estimates show that, after 1891, exporter states increased significantly their own fiscal revenue. On the other hand, mining was capital and technology intensive, inputs that were domestically scarce in Mexico. To finance those activities foreign investment was promoted centrally, weakening the relative power of local elites.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2011-06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Latin America; Caribbean
Regional and Urban History: Latin America; Caribbean
Thema
Institutions
Fiscal Federalism
Public Finance and Endowments
Finanzgeschichte
Finanzbeziehungen
Verhandlungstheorie
Brasilien
Mexiko

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Martínez Fritscher, André
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Banco de México
(wo)
Ciudad de México
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
04.11.1970, 04:54 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Martínez Fritscher, André
  • Banco de México

Entstanden

  • 2011

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