The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control

Arbeitspapier

We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates´ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 240

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: elections ; polarization ; strategic delegation ; bureaucracy ; foreign influence

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Aytimur, R. Emre ; Boukouras, Aristotelis ; Schwager, Robert
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
• (where): Göttingen
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109039
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET