Arbeitspapier
Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Dynamic Games
This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelberg behaviour. We define a class of games where the strong time-consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as `perfect uncontrollable' and provide two examples based on (i) a model where firms invest so as to increase consumers' reservation prices, based upon Cellini and Lambertini (CEJOR, 2003); and (ii) a model where firms compete to increase their respective market shares, based upon Leit- mann and Schmitendorf (IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 1978).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 535
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
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Zeitkonsistenz
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Dynamisches Spiel
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
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Bologna
- (wann)
-
2005
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4755
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cellini, Roberto
- Lambertini, Luca
- Leitmann, George
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2005