Arbeitspapier

Weak and Strong Time Consistency in Differential Oligopoly Games with Capital Accumulation

We illustrate two differential oligopoly games with capital accumulation where, alternatively, the accumulation dynamics of productive capacity is modelled either `a la Solow—Swan or `a la Ramsey. We show that in the first case the open-loop Nash equilibrium is only weakly time consistent, while in the second it is strongly so, although the Ramsey game is not state linear.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 544

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Oligopol
Zeitkonsistenz
Investition
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2005

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4745
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cellini, Roberto
  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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