Arbeitspapier

Information Sharing and Information Acquisition: Ownership and Coverage

We examine the conditions required for the existence of private credit bureaus, their ownership and coverage. Our model implies that bank consortia will most likely be preferred by banks, but that they will lead to restricted coverage. Independent credit bureaus have higher coverage, but they require good institutions. This implies an important role for public credit registers in developing countries with weak institutions. Our empirical findings largely support the implications of our model.

ISBN
978-82-7553-646-2
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2011/23

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Thema
information sharing
credit markets
default
adverse selection

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Karapetyan, Artashes
Stacescu, Bogdan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Norges Bank
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Karapetyan, Artashes
  • Stacescu, Bogdan
  • Norges Bank

Entstanden

  • 2011

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