Arbeitspapier
Dividing by demanding: object division through market procedures
We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to implement bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 359
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Exchange and Production Economies
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Subject
-
Object Division
Market Procedure
Perles-Maschler Solution
Verhandlungstheorie
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Haake, Claus-Jochen
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (where)
-
Bielefeld
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-6050
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Haake, Claus-Jochen
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Time of origin
- 2004
Other Objects (12)
Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures
Cognitively Demanding Object Negotiation While Walking and Texting
Brigands dividing spoil
Dividing the Indivisible
Dividing Quantum Channels
Rightly dividing the word
Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system
The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories
Dividing Attention Increases Operational Momentum
Dividing bads under additive utilities
A model of fault allocation in contract law: Moving from dividing liability to dividing costs
The Method of Dividing Astronomical Instruments
Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures
Cognitively Demanding Object Negotiation While Walking and Texting
Brigands dividing spoil
Dividing the Indivisible
Dividing Quantum Channels
Rightly dividing the word
Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system
The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories
Dividing Attention Increases Operational Momentum
Dividing bads under additive utilities
A model of fault allocation in contract law: Moving from dividing liability to dividing costs
The Method of Dividing Astronomical Instruments
Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures
Cognitively Demanding Object Negotiation While Walking and Texting
Brigands dividing spoil
Dividing the Indivisible
Dividing Quantum Channels
Rightly dividing the word
Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system
The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories
Dividing Attention Increases Operational Momentum
Dividing bads under additive utilities
A model of fault allocation in contract law: Moving from dividing liability to dividing costs