Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics ; 340
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Bielefeld
- (wer)
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Center for Mathematical Economics
- (wann)
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2002
- Urheber
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Brams, Steven J.
Kaplan, Todd R.
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29114306
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:31 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Brams, Steven J.
- Kaplan, Todd R.
- Center for Mathematical Economics
Entstanden
- 2002
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