Optimal destabilization of cartels

Arbeitspapier

The literature on cartel stability sidelines antitrust policy, whereas the literature on antitrust policy tends to neglect issues of cartel stability. This paper attempts to connect these two interrelated aspects in the context of an augmented quantity leadership model. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the residual demand. The antitrust authority decides on its own investigative effort and on the size of the fine that cartel members have to pay when they are detected. For testifying cartel members a leniency program is implemented. Our framework takes into account that these antitrust policy instruments are not costless for society. Our model demonstrates that the optimal antitrust policy exploits the inherent instability of a cartel to reduce its size.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Research Papers in Economics ; No. 7/19

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Thema: antitrust ; stability ; Cournot fringe ; oligopoly ; leniency

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): von Auer, Ludwig ; Pham, Tu Anh
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Trier, Fachbereich IV - Volkswirtschaftslehre
• (wo): Trier
• (wann): 2019

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207039
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ