Arbeitspapier

Accession games: A dynamic per-member partition function approach

In this paper we define and solve the accession game, a dynamic game containing a union and a set of applicants with a per-member partition function satisfying the conditions of Yi [17] to include negative externalities. The solution gives an equilibrium partition of the players as well as, after Morelli and Penelle [12], the optimal path, a subgame-perfect sequence of partitions, where each player maximises the present value of its payoffs subject to others' moves. While this game can be applied in general our motivation was to model the ongoing extensions of the European Union.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: LICOS Discussion Paper ; No. 90

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kóczy, László A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics
(where)
Leuven
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kóczy, László A.
  • Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics

Time of origin

  • 2000

Other Objects (12)