Artikel

A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach

A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener’s point of view, depend on the state of the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of statements from which the speaker chooses. A persuasion rule specifies which statements the listener finds persuasive. We study persuasion rules that maximize the probability that the listener accepts the request if and only if it is justified, given that the speaker maximizes the probability that his request is accepted. We prove that there always exists a persuasion rule involving no randomization and that all optimal persuasion rules are ex-post optimal. We relate our analysis to the field of pragmatics.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2006 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 395-410 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Persuasion
mechanism design
hard evidence
pragmatics

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rubinstein, Ariel
Glazer, Jacob
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Rubinstein, Ariel
  • Glazer, Jacob
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2006

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